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For a special issue of this journal Timmermans (2010) was asked to make critical comments on 
the suitability of Prospect Theory for travel behaviour research. His article offers a 
comprehensive overview of all kinds of criticism that one might encounter in the social sciences. 
When browsing through it during the preparation of an article about the transferability of 
Prospect Theories’ assumptions I came across a citation of an alleged inferior explanatory 
performance of Prospect Theory with respect to people’s choices in the TV game ‘Deal or no 
Deal’. I curiously downloaded the cited working paper and found that the citation was 
fabricated. Successively I thoroughly reviewed the argumentations in the article and in several 
references that support them. This revealed more untruthful citations, inaccuracies in the 
references, fallacies and selective use of empirical evidence. Most remaining critical comments 
appeared personal opinions without solid theoretical or empirical support. In this paper I present 
an in-depth discussion of the foundations of the comments in T and a critical examination of the 
references advanced to support them. It leads me to the conclusion that Timmermans’ criticism is 
unjust and that the references that underlie it actually support the suitability of Prospect Theory 
for travel choice modelling. This article might also offer a guideline for a careful interpretation of 
conclusions as a contribution to an improved peer-review process aimed to block articles 
contaminated with bad scientific practice. 
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a Note from Caspar Chorus (Editor-in-Chief): the paper “Timmermans’ misleading critique of Prospect Theory 
actually supports its relevance for travel choice modelling”, written by Evert Jan van de Kaa, was received at 
EJTIR’s editorial office on 19 August 2012. Upon receiving the article, the following course of action was chosen: 
(1) Evert Jan van de Kaa was informed that his paper would be published in our next issue, without being 
reviewed by me nor by one or more external referees. This, to ensure that the paper would be completely 
representative of van de Kaa’s own opinion. (2) the paper was sent to Harry Timmermans the next day, together 
with the invitation to submit a reply before 20 October, which would also be published in EJTIR (together with 
van de Kaa’s paper) without being reviewed. Harry Timmermans’ reply was received 15 October, and is 
published in this same issue. 
b P.O. Box 5015, 2600 GA, Delft, NL, E: e.j.vandekaa@rstrail.nl 
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In my opinion readers and peer reviewers of a scientific journal like EJTIR are entitled to trust 
that the submitted articles offer an adequate explanation of the discussed concepts and to feel 
assured of the open-mindedness, solidity and, above all, truthfulness of citations, assertions and 
argumentations. The contributors should also have made a fair effort to find out whether their 
explanations, assertions or argumentations were published before and, if so, should have 
credited the concerned authors by referring to them, thus avoiding the suspicion of plagiarism. If 
references are used to reduce the article length by opening-up earlier explanations and/or 
substantiating argumentations, their relevance for those purposes should be above reasonable 
doubt. The previous elaborations of good scientific practice may seem like stating obvious points. 
But if a contributor does not behave according to these requirements even a solid peer review 
might not detect such scientific carelessness and/or misconduct1. I found suggestions of 
violations of several of these principles in a critical review of the relevance of Prospect Theory for 
travel choice modelling under uncertainty in this journal (Timmermans, 2010). Particularly, I 
uncovered the following errors and/or violations of good scientific practice: 
- Misrepresentation of elements of PT as advanced by Kahneman and Tversky (Sect. 2);  
- Inaccurate referring (Sect. 3.1);  
- Fabrication of empirical evidence questioning the suitability of PT for transport choice 
modelling (Sect. 3.2); 
- Fabrication of findings from a literature survey that, if it existed, was not accounted for (Sect. 
3.3);  
- Underserved referring to one’s own publications (Sect. 3.4); 
- Calling suspicion upon oneself of plagiarism (Sect. 3.5); 
- Misrepresentation of other scientist’s findings (Sect. 3.6) 
- Selective, tendentious and/or false accounts of findings from one’s co-authored publications 
(Sect. 3.7) 
- Positing and/or citing conclusions based on fallacious arguments (Sect. 3.7); 
- Using personal opinions in argumentations without stating these as such (Sect. 4); and 
- Selective and prejudiced use of empirical evidence supporting and/or undermining PT’s 
credibility (Sect. 5). 
Not knowing the intentions behind these errors and/or violations it is not up to me to judge 
whether one or more exceed the boundaries of scientific integrity. In this article I intend to 
present my findings both carefully and extensively. A more extensive underpinning is given in a 
working paper (Van de Kaa, 2012), which is available upon request.  
My investigation into the appropriateness of the referring in T (from now on used for referring 
to Timmermans, 2010) was straightforward: I consulted the referred publications and checked 
whether their content supported the corresponding citations and inferences in T. Where feasible I 
just browsed through the concerned texts but quite often a more thorough secondary analysis 
appeared required to arrive at solid conclusions. In my report hereafter I strive to offer quotations 
                                                        
1 Contemporary interpretations of scientific misconduct are variations on ‘Presentation to the scientific 
community of fabricated, falsified, or misappropriated observations or results and violation against good 
scientific practice’ (National Research Ethics Council, Finland, 1998, in Nylenna et al., 1999 p. 58).  
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of corresponding texts from both T and the referred literature, thus allowing the reader to judge 
for himself. 
For hardly if any of the few dozens of critical comments on Prospect Theory (PT) in T it was 
indicated whether or not these also applied to the nowadays dominant Random Utility 
Maximization (RUM) theory or to other theories or models that are currently applied in transport 
research. As the comments thus apparently aimed at an absolute, rather than relative, assessment 
of the strengths and limitations of PT, one might expect that some threshold or criterion to 
establish their (ir)relevance for modelling uncertainty in travel choices would have been applied. 
However, I found no indications for this. This complicates an unbiased appraisal of these 
critiques. 
Looking for a methodologically sound approach for such an unbiased appraisal I considered that 
the behavioural sciences have quite a history in discussions about the correctness and/or 
applicability of choice theories and models. Well-known examples are the ongoing criticism (e.g. 
Simon, 1955; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) on neoclassical economics and other versions of 
Utility Theory (UT) and the rejection of both UT’s ‘unbounded rationality’ and the heuristics-and-
biases concept of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) by the ‘ecological rationalists’ (e.g. Gigerenzer 
and Todd, 1999). Many comments in T and other publications that were advanced against PT 
were similar to those considered in these discussions. Perhaps as a response to early criticism on 
neoclassical economics, Friedman (1953) wrote an authoritative article that sheds light on the 
value one might attach to such arguments. I will apply his line of reasoning in my review of the 
arguments in T. As the latter was published towards the end of 2010, wherever I advance 
references in my review I will refrain from works that were published later. 
In section 2 T’s reproduction of the statements and underlying assumptions of PT is analysed. 
Section 3 discusses T’s referring. Section 4 is concerned with the comments about the accuracy of 
PT’s description of the human choice process and section 5 evaluates the advanced empirical 
evidence about the usefulness of PT for travel choice modelling. My review is closed with some 
recommendations and conclusions (Sect. 6). 
2. Reproduction of the statements and underlying assumptions of PT  
T (p. 372) summarizes some core assumptions of PT in a concise overview. Except for some minor 
flaws this offers, in my opinion, a fair reproduction of the essence of PT. However, scattered over 
T I found several notions that are at odds with the publication of PT. I will discuss these in the 
order of appearance in the text. 
1. ‘Kahneman and Tversky questioned the validity of EUT … It should be noted that this position 
relates to the basic form of EUT’ (T p. 372, my emphasis); ‘the most basic version of EUT … is the 









=∑  … a deterministic decision rule is 
assumed in this classical case’ (T p. 371); and ‘each outcome j of the nth risky prospect is defined 
by the values of a vector of observable attributes X = { xk; 1 ≤ k ≤ K}’ (T p. 370).  
The italicised statement is not true: preceding their critique on EUT KT (from now on referring to 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) explicitly mentioned that, following most economic applications, 
they adopted the assumption of risk aversion and thus a concave utility function u(x). That is, 
                                                        
2 I follow Timmermans’ definitions here. Actually, Bernoulli (1738) posited his concept of a concave utility 
function of money against the expected value concept which was developed in a correspondence between Pascal 
and Fermat (1654). 
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=∑ in stead of the expected value model. I checked the comparisons 
of PT and EUT in KT and found that for all considered choice experiments they consistently 
assumed a concave expected utility formula u(x). Moreover, with one exception the observed 
violations of EUT would also be found for any continuously increasing function u(x). If the 
italicised statement had been true, this would weaken the credibility of PT as an improvement of 
EUT, as only a poor version of the latter would have been considered. Except as qualification of 
PT I found no rationale for its inclusion in T’s texts. 
2. ‘Similar to the more advanced approaches for riskless decisions, shown in Figure 1, it may be 
conceptually richer to distinguish between mental representation, cognitive environment, preference 
structure and choice rule to avoid any confounding as potentially done in PT’ (T p. 373, my emphasis).  
This statement is unjust. It draws on the conceptual framework in Figure 1 that was apparently 
fabricated (see Sect. 3.3). Kahneman and Tversky considered, for example, a decision frame as ‘a 
representation of the act, outcomes and contingencies that are relevant to the decision maker’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 p. 299) and according to Kahneman (2000 p. xiv) the ‘true objects 
of evaluation and choice (in PT) are neither objects in the real world nor verbal descriptions; they 
are mental representations’. More recently, Kahneman was even honoured3 by fellow scientists of 
the Federation of Behavioral and Brain Sciences for, among more, his contribution (together with 
Tversky) ‘to model the interplay between the alternative framing4 of information, its mental 
representation as a function of the internal state of the decision maker, and the decisions based on 
that information.’ 
3. ‘Loss aversion implies that travellers will likely experience that they could have done better. 
Repeatedly using updated reference points will then, ceteris paribus, lead to decisions and choices 
that deviate from the predictions of standard PT’ (T p. 378, my emphasis). 
It is not true that standard PT does not allow for reference updating between successive choices. 
In KT (p. 286-288) a whole section was devoted to shifts of reference points that may occur 
between two successive choices in a sequence. 
4. ‘In (C)PT risk attitude is nothing but a descriptive label of the curvature of the utility function and the 
weighted-probability function presumed to underlie travel choices … It cannot be ruled out that the 
characteristic curvature can be caused by mechanisms other than risk attitudes’ (T p. 374, my 
emphasis).  
This statement is wrongful. In KT the reference-dependent framing of attribute levels is explained 
as consequence of underlying psychophysical adaptation and perception mechanisms and in 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) a more extensive psychophysical substantiation of the shapes of 
both the value and weighted-probability functions is given. Thus, the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitude of PT is indeed a descriptive label but this is founded on generally accepted underlying 
psychophysical mechanisms. If the credibility of a theory would be increased by considering risk 
attitude as more than a descriptive label PT should have been praised in T.  
5. ‘Because PT assumes a deterministic utility function and utility-maximizing behaviour, given 
the edited prospects, it implicitly assumes that individuals do take all information into account’ (T p. 
376, my emphasis).  
This statement is not true. KT just assumed that PT’s edited-prospects-value-maximization 
algorithms would explain/describe the choices of most individuals of the concerned populations. 
                                                        
3 see http://www.fabbs.org/index.php?cID=169 (accessed 2012-06-04). 
4 Initially KT also used the term ‘editing’ for what from 1984 onward they systematically called ‘framing’, which I 
adopt here as a synonym. Note that several feasible framing rules might yield reference points different from the 
current asset position. 
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Maybe the argument drew on the misconception that a compensatory, value-maximizing 
appraisal of attributes is only feasible in connection with a complete, context-independent 
preference ordering of all feasible alternatives as presumed in UT? In connection with T’s other 
texts the statement was also superfluous, unless meant to weaken the credibility of PT.  
6. ‘The literature on riskless choices has identified a series of effects influencing riskless choice 
behaviour, including effects of choice set, context, and taste variation to mention a few … (C)PT 
does not take these effects into account’ (T p. 380, my emphasis).  
Posited in this way, the italicized statement is not true. Obviously, it cannot be excluded that PT 
cannot account for any of the unspecified effects that might be meant by T but PT was proposed 
as a theory in which, different from (E)UT, an individual’s judgments and/or tastes might differ 
dependent on the composition, presentation and perception of the choice set and the choice 
context, see for example KT (p. 275): ‘the preference order between prospects need not be 
invariant across contexts, because the same offered prospect could be edited in different ways 
depending on the context in which it appears.’ 
3. Use of the relevant literature 
3.1 Characterization of T’s bibliography  
In Table 1 I classified T’s bibliography according to content, field and document type. Two entries 
were redundant, as they did not appear elsewhere. More conspicuously may be the very frugal 
referring to the large body of literature about PT from economics, decision theory and other 
social sciences. When I was diving more deeply in T’s referring I stumbled upon several factual 
inaccuracies which complicated appraisal and/or retrieval: 
Table 1. Characterization of the entries in the bibliography 
Direct theoretical or empirical evidence about the suitability of PT→ 
↓ Scientific discipline and document type 
Yes No Not 
referred  
TRANSPORT RESEARCH    
Journal articles and book chapters 5 9 - 
CD-ROM proceedings and working papers 1  6 (4) 7 (5) 2 (1) 
OTHER DISCIPLINES    
Journal articles and book chapters 3 7 - 
CD-ROM proceedings and working papers1  - 1 (1) - 
1 Figures between brackets: papers that were republished as peer reviewed articles before T was proofed. 
 
- T p. 372: the reference to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for the power functional form of the 
value function was wrong, this formula was not published before the posit of CPT by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992 p. 309); 
- T p. 375, 382: the journal article referred to Camerer was actually written by Carbone;  
- T p. 376, 382: the working paper of Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007) was misdated to 2008; 
- T p. 380: Habin and Miller should have been spelled Habib and Miller; 
- T p. 380: the 2009 TRB conference paper of Chen et al. was misdated to 2008; 
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- T p. 382: the title of the 2005-article of Avineri and Prashker in Transportation Research C  was 
cited wrongly. The correct title is ‘Sensitivity to travel time variability: Travelers’ learning 
perspective’;  
- T p. 382: Borgers et al.’s paper did not cover pp. 221-234 in ‘Advances in Culture, Tourism 
- and Hospitality Research’ but pp. 215-226 of its Volume 1, which was not published in 
Bangalore by MacMillan but in Oxford, UK by Elsevier.  
- T p. 382: Apparently, Chen et al. contributed to the 88th Annual TRB Meeting, not the 85th.  
In the following I aim to use the correct references, also in citations of T. 
3.2 A falsified account of other scientists’ findings? 
To me, initially the most convincing argument that questioned the applicability of PT to travel 
behaviour research was the statement (T p. 376) that in a study by Blavatskyy and Pogrebna 
(2007) ‘remarkably, CPT never outperformed other decision theories, regardless of the assumed 
probabilistic choice rules’.  
This statement was fabricated. Close reading of the concerned working paper revealed that it 
contains no information that supports it. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007 p. 10) explicitly stated 
that ‘we do not estimate … (C)PT’. They mentioned that one might consider Rank-dependent 
utility theory (RDU), which they examined, as a version of PT in which the participants ranked 
all choice options as gains. This RDU offered the best loglikelihood in five of 20 listings, the 
second best in six, the third best in eight and the fourth best in one. In any listing it thus 
performed better than at least three other theories. Also if RDU is considered as a version of PT 
the statement that CPT never outperformed other decision theories was thus invented.  
3.3 A fabricated conceptual framework?  
In T several times is referred to Figure 1 (replicated below) as substantiating evidence for 
critiques on PT. Its title is ‘Conceptual framework and key topics in seminal behavioural analyses 
in marketing, urban planning and transportation research’ and it is introduced as follows: 
‘Especially outside of transportation research, a large number of studies, based on a variety of 
theories, concepts, and measurement approaches has been suggested to analyze and model 
individual and household decisions. Figure 1 gives an overview of dominant approaches and key 
issues that have been addressed and explored in the early years (1970-1980s). These are listed in 
the context of a general conceptual framework that summarizes the common elements of the 
various approaches (Timmermans, 1982)’ (T p. 369).  
In the remaining texts not any further account is rendered of the origin and foundations of this 
diagram, nor of the purpose of its creation, nor of its entitlement to the claim that it offers an 
overview of early research and a general conceptual framework as meant in the quotation above. 
Also, except for the 1982-article further references that might provide such an account are 
missing. This suggests that Figure 1 was replicated from and accounted for in the 1982 article. 
However, the 1982-article did not provide any account of the general conceptual framework nor 
an overview of the early research that Figure 1 claims to provide. It empirically investigated 
consumers’ ratings of some ‘objective’ attributes of shopping centres and contained a 
hypothetical process flowchart for destination choice. As any explicit support for the pretensions 
of Figure 1 is missing in both the 2010 and 1982 articles I examined if it was self-explaining and 
unambiguous, which appeared not the case. For example, its keywords might be conceived as 
states, processes or functions; many research topics might be assigned to different keywords; the 
arrows might be conceived as relationships indicating exertion of control or time sequence or 
flow of information; etc. It is conspicuous that the keyword ‘cognitive environment’, which in the 
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1982 diagram represented a set of perceived destinations with their attributes, was adopted in 
Figure 1 as a core element of a general choice behaviour concept. The prominent presence of the 
‘mental representation’ block might be even more confusing, in view of its position amidst 
several blocks that accommodate specific appearances of it, like ‘value system’ and ‘cognitive 
environment’, to mention a few. 
 
To grasp an idea about the degree to which the keywords in Figure 1 are nevertheless 
representative for the research effort that it claims to describe I did an ‘all fields, all document 
types’ search of these terms on Scopus (Table 1). The occurrence of most keywords in the 
concerned literature appeared very low. This indicates that these keywords and the attribution of 
topics to them are inappropriate for the provision of an overview of the dominant approaches 
and key issues that they claim to describe.  
Table 1. Occurrence of keywords in marketing, urban planning and transport literature 
Number of articles found in full text search on SCOPUS1 → All years 1970-1989 1970-1989 
which contained any of the choice-related concepts in Figure 1 ↓ All fields All fields 3 fields1 
“decision problem” OR “decision context” 15,168 1,229 15 
“value system” OR motivation OR needs OR aspiration OR 
“information level” OR “personal objectives” 
2,300,562 234,878 >>100 
“mental representation”  14,257 232 5 
“objective environment” 155 10 2 
“cognitive environment”  272 8 0 
“preference structure”  1,906 88 7 
choice 973,867 86,915 >>100 
1 accessed Februari 2012. 1 “urban planning” OR marketing OR (transport OR travel). 
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As I was not able to retrieve any evidence that supports the claim that Figure 1 offers a solid 
overview of early research as well as a general conceptual framework for choice behaviour, the 
firm statement of these pretensions (T p.369) and the reference to Timmermans’ 1982 article are, 
in my opinion, scientifically unfounded if not misleading. In my review of the argumentations I 
will therefore consider the statements that were underpinned by referring to Figure 1 as 
unsubstantiated personal opinions.  
3.4 Undeserved citations of one’s own publications? 
The bibliography in T counts, in addition to Timmermans’ 1982-article, 12 more papers that were 
co-authored by him. As discussed above, the once-only reference to the 1982 article does not 
supply evidence that compensates for the missing account of the claims based on Figure 1. Also 
the listing of the paper of Arentze and Timmermans (T p. 382) to which is not referred in the text 
was obviously not appropriate. Each of the remaining 11 entries is referred once-only in the texts. 
Hereafter I will consider whether these references are appropriate.  
Four co-authored works (of Chorus et al., 3 articles, and Sun et al.) were referred on page 370 in a 
listing of ‘different theories and models of decision making under risk and uncertainty (that) 
have been applied in transportation research’, together with two papers of other scientists. This 
was done under the self-imposed constraint of only referring to 21th century publications, which 
is, in my opinion, not a good reason to refrain from crediting prior publications. Obviously, the 
work of Chorus et al. (e.g. 2006) on Regret Theory deserved a reference here, but a rationale to 
refer to them more than once5 is missing. In my opinion Timmermans and colleagues might be 
credited for bringing Bayesian Belief networks under the attention of transport researchers as 
they considered the topic in several more articles from 2005 onward. A reference to this work 
appears thus well-deserved, though Sun et al.’s 2009-paper on CD-ROM might not have been the 
best way to do so. 
Without agreeing with the concerned argumentations, the references to Zhu and Timmermans (T 
p. 375) and Han et al. (T p. 377, 378) might be appropriate.  
On page 380 a lengthy argumentation led to the conclusion that ‘choosing PT because the 
researcher feels a reference point is necessary is not necessarily an adequate reason as several 
other utility-based alternative theories have been shown to offer the same mathematical 
functionality’. T did not refer to researchers who actually stated that they did so. I 
wholeheartedly agree with his statement, as I consider it self-evident that the reference 
point/state of PT is nothing else but an elaboration of the asset position to which an individual 
considers to be entitled, which is also at the heart of the, essentially relative, utility concept as 
posited by Bernoulli (1738). A researcher who would feel that a reference point is necessary 
would thus behave quite ignorant if he adopted this and all other assumptions of PT for that 
reason. Even if a researcher would act this way, I cannot see how this would provide any 
evidence against or in favour of the use of PT in transport research. The argumentation leading to 
the conclusion as cited above is thus redundant. In my opinion this also makes the five references 
that were advanced as supporting evidence in this argumentation undeserved. These comprised 
four co-authored papers with Borgers, Chen, Zhang and Zhu as leading authors. 
In sum, while five out of the 13 references to Timmermans’ own (co)authored papers might be 
deserved the remaining eight appear redundant. 
                                                        
5 In the overview one reference is given for each choice theory and applications such as in a stochastic model for 
multi-attribute choice were not considered to make a difference, except for Regret Theory. Chorus et al. (e.g. 2008) 
extended Regret Theory to multi-attribute multi-alternative choice settings and called it Random Regret 
Minimization. Just one reference to Chorus et al. would thus have been appropriate. 
EJTIR 12(4), 2012, pp. 440-458 
van de Kaa 
Timmermans’ Misleading Critique of Prospect Theory Actually Supports  
its Relevance for Travel Choice Modelling 
 
448
3.5 Independently arriving at earlier published findings?  
The brief overview of applications of PT to transportation research mentions that ‘Avineri and 
Prashker (2004, 2005, 2006) applied PT in a route choice setting … They found evidence of non-
linear decision weights and loss aversion’.  
In Avineri and Prashker (2006) PT was not applied in the concerned route choice context. They 
also did not refer to that term in that article and any reference in it to the work of Kahneman and 
Tversky is missing, too. During my PhD research6 this publication attracted my attention because 
one experiment described in it was earlier (2003) published in Transportation Research Record 1854, 
together with an exposition of CPT and Bayesian Learning models. In their 2006 article Avineri 
and Prashker presented an additional experiment and did not refer to their earlier consideration 
of CPT. I made a secondary analysis of the choice observations presented in the 2006 article and 
found evidence for ‘non-linear weighted probabilities’ as well as ‘reference-dependent framing 
and loss aversion’ (Table 8 in Van de Kaa, 2008 p.177). In the same table the same inferences were 
listed for the experiments described in the 2004 and 2005 articles of Avineri and Prashker. To my 
best knowledge my dissertation, and the article in Transport Reviews that draws on it (Van de Kaa 
2010a), are the only publications other than T in which the same inferences about the usefulness 
of PT are drawn from the 2004, 2005 and 2006 articles of Avineri and Prashker. 
During my PhD research I re-examined several evaluations of the usefulness of PT for explaining 
recurrent choice between probabilistic alternatives, in which the participants received feedback 
about the outcomes of their previous choices in the sequence (e.g. Barron and Erev, 2003; Avineri 
and Prashker, 2005). In view of the attention that KT payed to reference shifts I was surprised 
that the different studies adopted the same reference state7 for all successive choices. I considered 
that feedback-based updating of the reference state and heterogeneity in choice behaviour 
strategies might offer a fair explanation of such recurrent choices. This view is explicitly 
articulated in the constituent assumptions of EPT and elaborated on several places in my 
dissertation, see e.g. my evaluation of Avineri and Prashker (2005): ‘Considering the salience of 
the ‘instant endowment’ phenomenon it seems highly likely that the experienced outcomes of 
successive choices caused reference shifts … Following the assumptions of EPT, the consistency 
of intrapersonal choice behaviour in such recurrent choice contexts could be studied by 
presuming idiosyncratic reference state updating’ (Van de Kaa, 2008 p. 171). I was surprised to 
read that ‘ PT does not take such feedback and consequent learning and adaptation into account 
… Repeatedly using updated reference points will then, ceteris paribus, lead to decisions and 
choices that deviate from the predictions of standard PT’ (T p. 378) without reference to the 
earlier publication of this idea.  
3.6 Tendentious account of other scientists’ findings?  
Sect. 3.3. is introduced by the statement that ‘implicitly, PT assumes that when faced with 
replicated identical binary choices, subjects will made the same choice. There is overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. Carbone (1997), Hey and Orme (1994) and Ballenger and Wilcox (1997) 
to name a few report switching behaviour between 20 and 30%, fundamentally questioning the 
assumptions underlying PT’ (T p. 375, my emphasis).’  
                                                        
6 Note that Timmermans commented on the final draft of my dissertation in April 2008 and received the printed 
book in the summer of that year. 
7 I follow here Kahneman and Tversky (1984 p. 343 and following pages) who used the more generic term 
‘reference state’ as synonymous to ‘reference point’ and in later publications often used point ‘point’, ‘state’, 
‘value’ or ‘situation’ indiscriminately to indicate ‘the reference value to which current stimulation is compared 
(which) also reflects the history of adaptation to prior stimulation’ (Kahneman, 2002). 
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At first sight the firm statement that PT assumes that people make the same choices from 
replicated identical sets seems a fair interpretation of PT. T did not mention that this is also the 
common interpretation of RUM’s systematic utility function: ‘Random utility models assume, as 
does the economic consumer theory, that the decision maker has a perfect discrimination 
capability. However, the analyst is assumed to have incomplete information and, therefore, 
uncertainty must be taken into account’ (Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999 p. 7). The cited switching 
behaviour yields indeed unarguable evidence that subjects do not always make the same choices 
from identical choice sets. However, PT was not examined in any of these three references, let 
alone that its underlying assumptions were fundamentally questioned by their authors. These 
authors did thus not infer that their findings questioned PT’s assumptions fundamentally, but T 
inferred that from their articles. A thorough examination of all these articles revealed that 
genuine human error was the best explanation for people’s choice of different alternatives from 
the considered recurrent identical choice sets. PT does not explicitly discuss human error in 
connection with choice. It shares this with most theories of choice under risk and uncertainty but 
I found no evidence that any of these theories excluded human error either. I therefore found no 
scientifically sound rationale why these articles incited to question fundamentally the 
assumptions underlying these theories, and definitely not the particular ones underlying PT.  
Next, I tried to understand the meaning of the remaining texts of T’s Sect. 3.3. I could not grasp 
why adding a logistic term to PT’s value function by Schwanen and Ettema, Avineri and 
Prashker and several more transport researchers, to account for genuine human error and/or 
fluctuating tastes, should not be convincing. In my opinion this is not in conflict with PT. 
Obviously, the estimated parameters of PT and any other choice theory may differ, depending on 
the applied stochastic model in which it is embedded to account for errors and/or taste 
heterogeneity. But if this effect is so strong that wrong behavioural conclusions are drawn this 
would apply to any choice theory.  
Summarizing, in none of the five studies discussed above I found evidence that might give rise to 
questioning PT’s assumptions more than those of any other choice theory. That is why referring 
to this line of research in connection with discrediting PT’s assumptions seems unfounded and 
tendentious to me.  
3.7 fallacious, tendentious or false accounts of findings from one’s co-authored publications?  
Questioning PT’s so-called experiment-based foundations T (p. 375) stated that ‘Zhu and 
Timmermans (2010b) argued that ideally the analysis of stated preference/choice data should 
include both a model of preference and choice behaviour, plus a process model of how subjects 
create a mental representation of the hypothetical choice problem’.  
Elsewhere I documented an extensive re-examination of the referred article (Van de Kaa, in 
preparation). In brief, Zhu and Timmermans proposed several strong assumptions about the 
choice process, developed a model drawing on these assumptions, estimated the parameters of 
their model for the responses to a stated choice experiment and apparently deemed the fit of their 
model with these responses fair enough for conclusions like ‘our results showed that respondents 
seem to have applied extremely simple decision heuristics in the first stage’ (Zhu and 
Timmermans, 2010b p. 779). However, as other mental choice processes might be approached by 
the same mathematical algorithms and other mathematical algorithms, like for example a RUM 
model, might describe the same choices Zhu and Timmermans’ inferences were based on a 
combination of the ‘affirming-the-consequent’ and the ‘begging the question’ and/or ‘non-cause 
as cause’ fallacies8. Therefore, this also applies to their conclusion above, even though it was 
                                                        
8 These fallacies are well-documented in scientific literature, starting with Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 
(ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/sophistical/index.html). See Van de Kaa (in preparation) for the occurrance 
of these and some more fallacies in the transportation research literature. 
EJTIR 12(4), 2012, pp. 440-458 
van de Kaa 
Timmermans’ Misleading Critique of Prospect Theory Actually Supports  
its Relevance for Travel Choice Modelling 
 
450
formulated with some restraint. If the specious character of the argumentations would have 
recognized in T, the firm statement about the desirability to supplement choice models with 
mental-representation-creation process models would have been deliberately misleading. 
Assuming this was not the case makes the statement just another fallacy, this time formulated 
without much restraint. 
T (p. 380) referred to another paper of Zhu and Timmermans (2010a) who should ‘have argued 
that travelers may use multiple reference points. In their conceptualisation, however, reference 
points do not serve as anchors to distinguish between gains and losses, but rather as thresholds 
for accepting a decision strategy or not’.  
Scrutinizing their paper9 I did not find the term ‘reference point’ anywhere. Except for their 
bibliography ‘reference’ occurred only as ‘reference alternative’. This was introduced as follows: 
‘the individual compares the alternative with a given reference alternative to judge whether the 
alternative should be accepted or not …the reference alternative is an instance of the personal 
value space’ (Zhu and Timmermans, 2010a p.7). Their empirical study concerned the choice 
between going-home and continuing-shopping during a shopping trip. The continuing-shopping 
option was denoted as the reference alternative. Its utility was treated as an unknown parameter 
of the going-home alternative to be estimated. Such a ‘reference-alternative’ concept is very 
dissimilar from PT’s reference point that draws on hedonic adaptation to people’s earlier 
experiences. Both in their theoretical sections and empirical case study Zhu and Timmermans 
considered only one reference alternative and used the term ‘multiple’ nowhere in connection 
with ‘reference’ in any meaning. The citation that Zhu and Timmermans ‘have argued that 
travelers may use multiple reference points’ (T p. 380) is thus fabricated.  
T (p. 380, my emphasis) remarked that ‘it seems that transportation researchers have primarily 
explored the applicability of (C)PT to incorporate reference points in their models to differentiate 
between gains and losses … the use of reference points or thresholds has a long history in modelling 
riskless choices to model … relative utility theory (Zhang et al., 2004), historical disposition (Chen 
et al., 2008; Habib and Miller, 2009) and different frames of references as a function of 
accumulated experiences (Borgers et al., 2007). Hence … several other utility-based alternative 
theories have been shown to offer the same mathematical functionality’.  
Here, just in passing and without substantiation, reference points, that are current or expected 
asset positions, are lumped with threshold levels, which separate rejected from accepted 
alternatives. Also the listed theoretical concepts and references are advanced as offering the same 
mathematical functionality as PT. To my best knowledge, the mathematical functionality of PT’s 
reference point is to locate a kink and a convex-concave transition in the value function. Habib 
and Miller (2009, p. 92) presented a mixed-logit implementation of ‘the theoretical framework of 
PT for riskless choice’ in a ‘reference-dependent residential location choice model within a 
relocation context’ and compared it with a conventional RUM model. Adopting the 
characteristics of the current residence as reference-state levels they found that ‘the reference-
dependent model performs better than a conventional location choice model in terms of model fit 
and provides important behavioral insights’. Obviously, their model offered PT’s functionality as 
it was an implementation of it, but it was not utility-based as meant in T. The three articles that 
were co-authored by Timmermans are discussed extensively in Annex 4 of Van de Kaa (2012). 
They described utility-based models but did not consider reference points or otherwise offered 
the same mathematical functionality as PT. More seriously, all three co-authored articles 
contained flaws and/or misleading referring and/or fallacies. Hence, for different reasons none of 
the four cited articles provides evidence that ‘several other utility-based alternative theories have 
been shown to offer the same mathematical functionality’ (T p. 380).  
                                                        
9 Their conclusions and the arguments on which these were founded contained the same fallacies as listed in the 
previous paragraph (Van de Kaa, in preparation). 
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4. Accuracy of the description of the actual choice process 
Many objections to theories of choice concern that their assumptions do not correspond with 
ideas about people’s real-life choice processes. Often vague, subjective criteria are used such as 
‘face validity’ or adjectives like ‘well-known’ to strengthen such views. As people’s choice 
behaviour is a predominantly unconscious, covert process (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004), verifying or falsifying the truth of such essentially personal opinions about 
the real-life choice process, and thus of the critiques that are built on it, is impossible. Sometimes 
cognitive limitations are advanced against assumptions that seemingly require extensive 
calculations. The poor information processing capacity of the conscious mind apparently support 
such critiques. Some examples from social sciences are the objections by Simon (1955) and 
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) to the utility maximization assumptions of UT and, by the latter, also 
to PT’s value-maximization assumptions. In transportation research such critiques were 
advanced against CPT’s weighted-probability assumption (e.g. Fujii and Kitamura, 2004; Avineri 
and Prashker, 2006). But the information processing capacity of the unconsciousness is huge (e.g. 
Dijksterhuis, 2004), which is evidenced by the phenomenal computational skills of several idiots 
savants. And if people would not be able to perform complex calculations unconsciously, they 
might use simplifying heuristics or their memory to achieve a similar result as predicted by 
descriptive theories that are conceived as a paramorphic representation10 of the actual choice 
process (e.g. Hoffman, 1960; Swait, 2001). 
Friedman (1953 p. 21, his emphasize) illustrated this latter view with the expert-billiard-player 
example: ‘It seems not at all unreasonable that excellent predictions would be yielded by the 
hypothesis that the billiard player made his shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical 
formulas that would give the optimum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the 
angles, etc., describing the location of the balls, could make lightning calculations from the 
formulas, and could then make the balls travel in the direction indicated by the formulas. Our 
confidence in this hypothesis is not based on the belief that billiard players, even expert ones, can 
or do go through the process described; it derives rather from the belief that, unless in some way 
or other they were capable of reaching essentially the same result, they would not in fact be expert 
billiard players’. This line of thought makes it irrelevant whether or not theoretical assumptions 
correspond with algorithms of actual human choice processes, be it conscious or unconscious. For 
objections against such a lack of correspondence holds that ‘criticism of this type is largely beside 
the point unless supplemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing in one or another of these 
respects from the theory being criticized yields better predictions’ (Friedman, 1953 p. 31).  
Judging the relevance of the comments in T on particular assumptions of PT by this standard I 
found a dozen or two of these that did not meet these qualifications. Several of these were based 
on the alleged authority of Figure 1, the misrepresentations of PT and/or the fallacious 
arguments discussed in the preceding chapters, others were advanced without underpinning and 
for none of these solid empirical evidence was advanced. I will quote here one example from 
each page on which these appeared:  
- T p. 373: ‘it is not very realistic to assume that they’ (people) ‘first assign probabilities and 
then apply some weighting scheme’; 
- T p. 374: ‘PT lacks the behavioral concepts and may be too simple to avoid confounding of the 
various effects, shown in Figure 1, influencing the decision outcome’; 
- T p. 375: ‘some transportation researchers (e.g. Schwanen and Ettema, 2007) have added an 
error term to the value function and assumed a utility-maximizing decision rule to derive a 
logit-form model with a scale factor equal to 1. This set of assumptions is not very 
                                                        
10 That is, distinct in form but analogous in the nature and product of their operations. 
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convincing. Not only is the use of an error term in conflict with the original theory, but 
assuming utility-maximization in the choice part and not in the valuing part seems 
inconsistent. Moreover, the results depend upon the assumed scale parameter of the utility 
function’; 
- T p. 376: ‘However, many of the examined biases can also be explained by the alternative 
assumption that individuals demonstrate bounded rationality. They may filter attributes, set 
thresholds on attribute levels or may apply simplifying choice heuristics’; 
- T p. 377: ‘The assumption of given probabilities is also incongruent with the typical decision 
problem in activity-based analysis. In general, travellers will not know the objective 
probability of an outcome … Consequently, differentiation between decision weights and 
objective probabilities, as assumed by PT, may be impossible’; 
- T p. 378: ‘any comprehensive theory of travel behaviour under uncertainty should include 
principles and mechanisms how travellers develop beliefs about the credibility of the 
information and information source, how they learn about possible underlying control 
strategies and how they dynamically respond to information and recommendation provided 
under these circumstances. Standard (C)PT does not satisfy this criterion’;  
- T p. 379: ‘in case of well-articulated beliefs about the distribution of travel times, it is not 
readily evident why travellers would not directly act on their context-dependent beliefs of 
travel times and risk attitudes, rather than first processing and valuing travel time variability 
against some endogenous reference point’; 
- T p. 380: ‘departure time and route choice are just part of daily activity-travel scheduling 
processes and should be modeled accordingly’;  
- T p. 381: ‘the conceptual richness, the congruence of assumed causal mechanisms and 
structures, and the content validity of these models’ (based on PT, vdK) ‘as a manifestation of 
a theory of travel behavior under uncertainty is relatively poor compared to competing 
theories of travel behavior under uncertainty, such as (Bayesian) network learning models, 
and regret-theoretical approaches. These competing approaches are not more or less direct 
applications of theories originally developed in other domains, but try to develop a domain-
specific modeling approach based on the salient features and key underlying processes of 
activity-travel behavior under uncertainty. Making travel decisions under uncertainty is not 
even close to gambling for money!’  
An illustrative example is the last quotation above. It precedes T’s final conclusions and draws on 
a posited better performance of learning models and regret theory. Timmermans was well-
known with these concepts in transport research settings, as he co-authored many articles in 
which they were considered. Yet the only arguments elsewhere in T that supported PT’s 
inferiority for transport research compared to Bayesian learning models  concerned its inability 
for reference updating between recurrent choices (which was a misrepresentation, see Sect. 2 item 
4 above). To my best knowledge, before 2011 no comparisons were reported of the performance 
of PT and Regret Theory in transport research. Also nowhere else in T any supporting evidence 
was advanced for the claim that regret-theoretical approaches are more useful as a theory for 
travel behaviour under uncertainty than PT.  
In sum, T’s statements above and the many similar ones that were not quoted should, in the 
absence of solid evidence, be conceived as personal opinions that lack scientific underpinning. 
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5. Use of empirical evidence 
T (p. 375, 377) doubted the applicability of (C)PT to travel behaviour research because ‘PT is 
largely based on experiments … Most empirical evidence supporting prospect theory is based on 
gambling experiments in which subjects are requested to choose one of two prospects, specifying 
the probability of associated outcomes.’  
The idea that (C)PT is mainly concerned with gambles might rise from the articles in which PT 
and CPT were proposed, which were the only publications of PT to which T referred. Browsing 
through Kahneman and Tversky’s (2000) anthology ‘Choices, values and frames’ reveals a wealth of 
experiments and real-life observations for which the different assumptions of PT offered an 
explanation, including choice under uncertainty, context-dependent framing, endowment effects, 
investment decisions etc. There and elsewhere (Van de Kaa, 2010b) I found several studies 
outside the travel research field in which the assumptions of PT appeared to explain choice under 
risk or uncertainty better than EUT and hardly if any that demonstrated the opposite. 
T (p. 374, 375) doubted the credibility of the empirical evidence that these experiments offered for 
the usefulness of PT for real-life choice modelling: ‘the experimental tasks used to test prospect 
theory typically look artificial … many examples seem designed to articulate and amplify known 
biases … Experimental tasks often look like quizzes to test whether students understand 
expected utility theory. They require … the calculation of losses and gains and overall payoff. 
Subjects … certainly will make mistakes … the basis of responses in case of the gambling 
experiments are given probabilities and decision outcomes, how unrealistic they may be. 
Subjects’ … mental representation may differ from the constructed reality … one cannot rule out 
the possibility that violations reflect incongruent mental representation and simple error … 
Because prospect theory is largely based on experiments, evidence of risk aversion may have 
been confounded with errors introduced in understanding the experimental task, the framing of 
the task itself, limited information processing/bounded rationality in completing the task or any 
other process affecting the response-generating process.’  
The gambles discussed in KT and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) concerned choices from simple 
binary choice sets that participants might well have performed intuitively. Such experiments 
were replicated dozens of times in countries all over the world and the observed choice patterns 
were remarkably similar. The outcomes are generally used in economics and other social sciences 
to test and compare the usefulness of EUT and alternative theories for choice under risk. I found 
no other publications in which their credibility for that purpose was doubted. T himself (p. 373-
374) suggested that ‘learning models for decisions under uncertainty may have more to offer than 
non-dynamic models of decisions under uncertainty such as (cumulative) prospect theory’, 
referring to the findings of Hertwig et al. (2004). These findings were from choice experiments 
concerning similar gambles with probabilities that were either given or had to be learned from 
experience. T (p. 375) also accepted the findings from this kind of simple gambles as 
‘overwhelming evidence’ for a non-deterministic utility function (wrongly, see Sect. 3.6) without 
disputing the credibility of these experiments. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section , 
T (p. 381) stated that the content validity of PT for travel behaviour under uncertainty was poor 
relative to regret-theoretical approaches while Regret Theory (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1982) was 
proposed as an alternative explanation of exactly the same gambles as discussed in KT.  
As discussed in Sect. 3.2, the statement that in explaining the UK and Italian versions of ‘Deal or 
No Deal’ ‘CPT never outperformed other decision theories, regardless of the assumed 
probabilistic choice rule’ (T p. 376) was fabricated. According to Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007), 
who did not consider loss aversion, the overall best performing theory was EUT with an expo-
power utility specification (EUT-exp) while RDU offered the second-best fit.  
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For the Dutch, German and USA versions of ‘Deal or no Deal’ Post at al. (2008) compared the 
performance of EUT-exp with a full-fledged PT implementation with reference updating. In all 
five considered settings PT outperformed EUT, offering an improvement in loglikelihood 
between 11% and 16%. The ‘Deal or No Deal’ game thus confirms rather than weakens the large 
body of empirical evidence from real-life and experimental settings that support the usefulness of 
EPT for choice modelling.  
T’s overview of concrete applications of PT to empirical transport behaviour under risk and 
uncertainty (e.g. Li and Hensher, 2011, for an overview) is restricted, both in number of studies 
and depth of treatment. For the few referred studies no comparison is offered between the 
performance of PT and other choice theories. An exception is the study of Schwanen and Ettema 
(2009), for which statements that seemingly reduced its credibility were reiterated: ‘e.g. Schwanen 
and Ettema have added an error term to the value function and assumed a utility-maximizing 
decision rule … Not only is the use of an error term in conflict with the original theory, but 
assuming utility-maximization in the choice part and not in the valuing part seems inconsistent’ 
(T p. 373) and ‘A deterministic choice rule was assumed. Implicitly, this means that the authors 
assumed that the utility function is stochastic, theoretically violating prospect theory.’ I 
demonstrated the inappropriateness of this comment in Sect. 3.6 above. T also trivialized the 
improved model fit of CPT compared to EUT as found in this study: ‘Overall, differences with 
expected utility theory seem modest at best’ (T p. 377).  
Remarkably, T did not refer to any empirical transport choice study in which an implementation 
of PT was outperformed by UT or any other choice theory. Though in several places he 
questioned the appropriateness of PT’s loss-aversion concept for transport research (e.g. T p. 379: 
‘the question is whether loss aversion also plays a significant role in routine behaviour such as 
departure time, route and destination choice’) he also did not refer to the many transport studies 
(Van de Kaa, 2010a for an overview) in which reference-dependent models outperformed loss-
neutral UT models in explaining choice between alternatives with certain outcomes. 
In sum, T suggested that empirical evidence supporting the usefulness of PT as a descriptive 
choice theory is almost limited to simple gamble experiments while omitting references to much 
empirical research of other choice settings in social sciences at large; T called the credibility of this 
kind of gambling experiments and its usefulness for understanding transport choice under risk 
and uncertainty in question and at the same time presented inferences drawing on the same kind 
of experiments without commenting the nature of their empirical underpinning; T fabricated a 
poor performance of PT in explaining the ‘Deal or No Deal’ game while in the British and Italian 
versions PT’s sibling RDU performed second-best to EUT-exp and in the Dutch, German and 
USA versions PT outperformed EUT-exp; T disregarded empirical evidence for the usefulness of 
PT’s reference-dependent-framing and loss-aversion assumptions in transport choice under 
certainty; and T did not discuss the relative performance of PT and other theories in empirical 
transport choice studies under risk, uncertainty or certainty, except for one study, in which PT’s 
performance was played down. I experienced this as selective use of empirical evidence and 
considered it as misleading. It might explain why in T’s final conclusion-and-discussion section 
empirical evidence undermining or supporting PT’s (ir)relevance for transport research is 
missing.  
7. Recommendations and conclusions 
During an extensive examination I uncovered the many errors and/or violations of good 
scientific practice in T and several underlying articles. One might wonder how these could creep 
in EJTIR. I must confess that when I was reading the article for the first time I only found that 
most objections against PT’s process assumptions were of a general character and applied to EUT 
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and other familiar choice theories as well. If I had been a peer reviewer of T – which I was not – I 
am not sure at all that I would have found much more drastic objections than that. Not until I 
accidentally found the fabricated finding from the ‘Deal or No Deal’ game my mind-set changed, 
from ‘taking the trustworthiness of the article for granted’ into ‘being on the alert for violations of 
good scientific practice’. Uncovering these in T took me a multiple of the effort that one might ask 
of even the most devoted peer reviewer.  
I have the feeling that a thorough reading of this article might be helpful for editors and peer 
reviewers in uncovering bad scientific practice. In my feeling, a more than superficial screening 
of the bibliography might often be revealing. The occurrence of the following topics in an article 
should warrant a very critical attitude of editors and peer reviewers: 
- Any arguments and evidence yielding firm conclusions about the realism of mental 
processes; and  
- Any ‘empirical evidence’ for the ‘absolute’ applicability or validity of theories/models and 
their assumptions, instead of their ‘relative’ applicability, based on ceteris paribus 
comparisons of their model fits with those of well-known alternative choice concept. 
The final conclusion in T (p. 381-382) is: ‘at the current state of development, it (PT, vdK) lacks 
the rigor, scope, behavioural principles and mechanisms, and content validity to serve as a 
comprehensive theory of how individuals and households dynamically (re-)organize their 
activities and travel (departure, route choice, destination, transport mode decisions) along 
multiple horizons in uncertain, non-stationary environments in a ubiquitous information society, 
enforcing a diversity of travel control strategies, for which they can rely on past experiences. 
Applications of (C)PT to these types of choices represent an attempt to apply the theory in the 
wrong contexts.’  
This conclusion apparently draws on the statements and inferences without solid ground as were 
discussed in Sect. 4. These were for a large part based on the invalid substantiations and 
arguments uncovered in Sections 2 and 3. T’s final conclusion is thus based on scientifically 
invalid arguments and lacks solid theoretical and empirical substantiation, which reduces it to a 
personal opinion rather than a scientifically sound inference. This does not mean that its content 
is necessarily wrong. However, taking the empirical findings from other studies into account 
makes it, in my opinion, highly likely that an (extended) PT might serve as a comprehensive 
theory for transport choice explanation and prediction.  
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